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and the Polish Uprising of 1863 
Edyta M. Bojanowska 
This is a fateful crisis—almost Russia's "to be or not to be" moment—likely 
more important than the year 1812. 
—The censor A. V Nikitenko about the Polish Uprising, 
in a note dated 18 March 1863 
The closing of the Dostoevskii b ro the r s ' j ou rna l Vremia (1861-63) has 
intriguing and far-reaching consequences for the evolution of Fedor Dos-
toevskii's political philosophy and for our sense of Russia's ideological 
landscape around the time of the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland. The 
government closed the journal due to an article about Polish-Russian rela-
tions by Nikolai Strakhov entitled "Rokovoi vopros" (A Fateful Question), 
which appeared in Vremia in April 1863. Government officials and the 
public alike were shocked by what they took as the article's pro-Polish sen-
timents and its denigration of the Russian nation. Indeed, Andrzej Walicki 
compares the ensuing controversy to the storm caused by Petr Chaadaev's 
famous "Filosoficheskoe pis'mo" (Philosophical Letter, 1836).' Acting on 
Alexander IPs direct order, the minister of internal affairs, P. A. Valuev, 
closed the journal on 24 May, citing in his decision the "indecent and even 
subversive content" of Strakhov's article, which criticized the government 
and offended Russian national sentiment. The journal's general direction 
was also deemed "harmful."2 Valuev relieved the chief St. Petersburg cen-
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sor of his duties.3 Strakhov's name was banned from appearing officially 
on any editorial board for the next fifteen years.4 
The history of Russian journalism is chock full of similar postpublica-
tion censorship scandals, especially regarding national and imperial issues.5 
Yet several reasons make the episode with Strakhov worth reconsidering. 
First, with few exceptions, scholarly accounts tend to rely on Strakhov 
and Dostoevskii's postfactum protestations that the article was grossly mis-
understood. As early as 1971, however, Strakhov's American biographer, 
Linda Gerstein, disputed this approach to "A Fateful Question."6 Walicki's 
more recent analysis does not cohere with Dostoevskii and Strakhov's 
explanations either, though it does not overdy tackle them.7 Gerstein's 
skepticism is well founded, and further reasons not to take Strakhov and 
Dostoevskii's explanations at face value abound. Moreover, Strakhov's ar-
ticle is far from an anomaly in the April 1863 issue of Vremia. On the con-
trary, it fits integrally within its platform of relinquishing Russia's rights to 
Poland while keeping the Western Provinces. The above claims—about 
the true meaning, role, and implications of "A Fateful Question"—are fur-
ther supported by the articles that surround Strakhov's piece. The entire 
April issue of Vremia in fact presented a broad-based proposal, complete 
with theoretical underpinnings and policy implication, for restructuring 
the Russian empire into one based on tolerance and the consent of its 
constituent populations. 
Furthermore, the implications of an alternative and more accurate 
account of "A Fateful Question" and of Vremia's final issue are relevant 
not only for Strakhov but also for Dostoevskii. While Dostoevskii scholars 
have ignored Gerstein's brief but insightful comments about "A Fateful 
Question," her ideas deserve to be introduced into academic circulation 
within Dostoevskii studies. Dostoevskii is, after all, the one who commis-
sioned Strakhov's article and ushered it into his journal, fully informed of 
its content. "A Fateful Question" and Dostoevskii's ideological evolution 
have to make mutual sense. 
This will require revising our image of this evolution. Given Dosto-
evskii's well-known anti-Polish sentiments, the apparently opposite stance 
taken in Vremia's April 1863 issue needs greater elucidation than it has re-
ceived. Likewise, Dostoevskii as a political thinker is known for his support 
of an assertive and militaristic Russian imperial policy and for his deeply 
conservative nationalism. The widely popular monojournal Dnevnik pis-
3. A. V. Nikitenko, Dnevnik (Leningrad, 1955), 2:336. 
4. Linda Gerstein, Nikolai Strakhov (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 57. 
5. During Nicholas I's reign, Faddei Bulgarin and Nikolai Grech were briefly impris-
oned for their newspaper's review of Mikhail Zagoskin's Iurii Miloslavskii (1829); Moskovskii 
telegrafvias closed down and Nikolai Polevoi banned from practicing journalism after he 
unfavorably reviewed Nestor Kukol nik's Ruka Vsevyshnego Otechestvo spasla (1834); after 
Chaadaev's infamous "Philosophical Letter" appeared in print, die censor was relieved of 
his duties, die journal closed down, its editor exiled to Siberia, and die audior officially 
pronounced insane. 
6. Gerstein, Nikolai Strakhov, 106. 
7. Walicki, "Slavophile Thinkers," 90-92. 
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atelia (A Writer's Diary), which Dostoevskii published intermittently over 
the years 1873-1881, has cemented this image of the writer, but it can also 
be gleaned from his fiction. Why would he lend support to anti-imperial 
rebels in Vremia? Building on existing research that extends Dostoevskii's 
political liberalism beyond his exile years, I will argue that the affair sur-
rounding "A Fateful Question" opens up the possibility of what may be 
termed a democratic or tolerant phase in Dostoevskii's thinking about 
Russia's relation with its imperial peripheries.8 Most fundamentally, die 
affair shows that Dostoevskii had a political program on national-imperial 
issues already in the 1860s, well before his prominent participation in 
the country's politics through A Writer's Diary. This program ran counter 
to the opinions of both the government and the vocal nationalists of the 
Slavophile and conservative orientation. 
The Scandal and Its Dramatis Personae 
Before setting their sights on Vremia, the conservative Moscow journalists 
Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov campaigned against Russian emigres, 
particularly Aleksandr Herzen, whose London-based Kolokol supported 
the Polish cause. They were also scandalized by the silence of the lib-
eral St. Petersburg press, which they took as an expression of solidarity 
with the Poles.9 Strakhov's "A Fateful Question" polemicized directly with 
Katkov, who two months earlier called the Polish Question Russia's "fate-
ful question" in an editorial that recommended a decisive crushing of 
the uprising.10 Katkov's and Aksakov's journals soon published outraged 
polemics with Strakhov that doubled as denunciations. They criticized 
Strakhov's overly sympathetic treatment of the Poles as a galling lack of 
patriotism and as political recklessness: What will foreigners say? That the 
Russians agree with the Poles? The foreigners in question did take notice. 
Assuming the article was Dostoevskii's, the French Revue des deux mondes 
reprinted "A Fateful Question" as evidence of Russian support for the reb-
els.11 By withholding Strakhov's name and signing the article "Russkii" 
8. Ellen Chances has argued that Dostoevskii's political views in the Vremia period 
were closer to diose of the radical left than commonly assumed. See her "Pochvennichestvo: 
Ideology in Dostoevsky's Periodicals," Mosaic 7, no. 2 (Winter 1974): 73. On Dostoevskii's 
liberalism in the 1860s, see also V. A. Tunimanov, Tvorchestvo Dostoevskogo, 1854-1862 
(Leningrad, 1980), 287, and Nancy Ruttenburg, Dostoevsky's Democracy (Princeton, 2008). 
9. Dolinin, "K tsenzurnoi," 2:565-66. M. N. Kadcov edited Russkii vestnik and Mos-
kovskie vedomosti, while Aksakov edited Den'. Nikitenko records reactions to Strakhov's ar-
ticle in his Dnevnik, 2:335. 
10. M. N. Katkov, "Pol'skii vopros," Russkii vestnik 1 [24 February] (1863), see com-
mentary to Dostoevskii, "Otvet redaktsii 'Vremeni' na napadeniie 'Moskovskikh vedo-
mostei,'" PSS, 20:317. The very volume diat printed Strakhov's article contained other 
polemics with Katkov and with Den'. See Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 54-65, 103-20. Political 
differences aside, Katkov's decision to denounce Vremia likely involved a wish to eliminate 
a rival journal. 
11. The Revue article appeared on 1 August 1863 (commentary to Dostoevskii, "Otvet 
redaktsii," PSS, 20:318). On Revue's mistaken attribution of die article to Dostoevskii, see 
A. S. Dolinin, "Dostoevskii i Strakhov," in N. K. Piksanov, ed., Shestidesiatye gody (Moscow, 
1940), 256. 
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(A Russian), Vremia cast "A Fateful Question" as expressing a widespread 
attitude. Moskovkie vedomosti found this presumptuous and taunted the 
anonymous "masked bandit": "Quand on a son opinion, il faut en avoir 
le courage."12 Katkov's newspaper defended the outraged feelings of true 
Russians upon reading Vremia's falsehoods; ironically, the "true Russian" 
who signed the note was a K. Peterson.13 
Katkov, the owner of Moskovskie vedomosti, was a powerful political fig-
ure. His outspoken attacks against the Poles and calls for a decisive defeat 
of what he saw as a grave separatist threat to the empire made his the most 
important public voice in Russia. Andreas Renner calls him "the opinion-
maker of 1863"; Herzen was right that Katkov's denunciation wielded a 
"terrible power."14 In his propagandist^ articles, Katkov skillfully stoked 
the fires of nationalism, portraying Poland as a political vampire raised 
from the dead to drink Russian blood.15 Recent accounts of Katkov's po-
litical journalism credit him and his like-minded nationalists with intro-
ducing far-reaching changes in the political culture of the empire, such as 
"inventing from below" the Russification policy of Alexander III.16 Katkov 
shaped, rather than propagated, the government's agenda.17 
For Fedor Dostoevskii, another key persona of the scandal, the year 
1863 marked the pinnacle of his postexile rehabilitation—with both the 
12. K. Peterson, "Po povodu stat'i 'Rokovoi vopros' v zhurnale Vremia," Moskovskie 
vedomosti 109 (1863); for Aksakov's journal's denunciation, see Den' 22 (1863). 
13. This irony was not lost on Dostoevskii when he drafted his reply to Moskovskie 
vedomosti, see Dostoevskii, "Otvet redaktsii," PSS, 20:101. 
14. Andreas Renner, "Defining a Russian Nation: Mikhail Katkov and the 'Invention' 
of National Politics," Slavonic and East European Review 81, no. 4 (2003): 674. Emphasis 
added. For Herzen's remark, and his regret about the closing of Vremia, which dared say 
"a few humane words on the subject of Poland," see V S. Nechaeva, ZhurnalM. M. iF. M. 
Dostoevskikh "Vremia," 1861-63 (Moscow, 1972), 308 (hereafter Zhurnal "Vremia"). 
15. For studies of Katkov's journalism during the Polish Uprising, his nationalist phi-
losophy, and his relationship with the government, see Olga Maiorova, From the Shadow 
of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855-1870 (Madison, 
2010), 94-127; Vladimir Kan tor, Sankt-Peterburg: Rossiiskaia imperiia protiv rossiiskogo khaosa 
(Moscow, 2008), 320-39; Henryk Glebocki, Fatalna sprawa: Kwestia polska w rosyjskiej mysli 
politycznej (1856-1866) (Krakow, 2000), 301-34; Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus 
und Offentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855-1875 (Cologne, 2000), 210-26; Renner, "Defining a 
Russian Nation"; V A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia (M. N. Katkov 
i ego izdaniia) (Moscow, 1978); and Martin Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov: A Political Biography, 
1818-1887 (The Hague, 1966). 
16. Renner, "Defining a Russian Nation," 661; and Maiorova, From the Shadow of Em-
pire, 94-127. 
17. Katkov's activism at the time of the Polish Uprising added impetus to his increas-
ing influence and gave him access to the highest echelons of power. He regularly ex-
changed information with the minister of the interior, Valuev, and the minister of foreign 
affairs, Aleksandr Gorchakov, flooding diem with policy memoranda. In the late 1860s, 
Valuev, fed up with Katkov's unofficial ministering, tried to exclude him from the edito-
rial board of Moskovskie vedomosti, only to have his decision reversed by Tsar Alexander II 
himself. See F. Sleznev and M. Smolin, "Velikii strazh imperii," in M. N. Katkov, Imperskoe 
slovo (Moscow, 2002), 19-25, and Dnevnik P. A. Valueva, ministra vnutrennikh del (Moscow, 
1961), 1:251. According to K. P. Pobedonostsev, there were ministries in Russia, "where 
nothing important was undertaken without consultation with Katkov." Tvardovskaia, Ide-
ologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia, 3. 
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authorities and readers. As punishment for his youdiful interest in French 
socialism, he had spent the years 1850-1854 in penal servitude in Omsk. 
In the camp, he was surrounded by an ethnically mixed convict popula-
tion that he portrayed as a microcosm of the Russian empire in his semi-
fictionalized memoir Zapiski iz Mertvogo doma (Notes from the House of 
the Dead). Shordy after returning to St. Petersburg in 1859, he launched 
Vremia with his brother Mikhail. The enormous popularity of The House of 
the Dead, serialized in Vremiain 1861-1862, was largely responsible for the 
journal's success. 
The cultural mission of Vremia was to reconcile the Westernizing and 
Slavophile trends in Russian culture in the name of a uniquely Russian 
third way called pochvennichestvo, or a return to the "soil" (pochva)—the 
native basis from which a strong nation would spring.18 Unlike the Slavo-
philes, pochvenniki did not reject the benefits that accrued to Russia as a 
result of westernization. Unlike die Westernizers, they saw value in some 
traditional Russian institutions and in tapping native spiritual resources. 
Westernization was a necessary phase, but the pochvenniki held diat die 
Russian nation now needed to be infused by native springs. To diis end, 
the educated, westernized nobility and intelligentsia was to "relearn" Rus-
sianness from the lower, uneducated classes. This would heal the crip-
pling social rift, bring about mutual respect, and create a superior na-
tional alloy. 
Strakhov did much to render this philosophy coherendy on the pages 
of Vremia. Dostoevskii valued Strakhov's enormous erudition and his train-
ing in philosophy and natural sciences.19 Though he wrote prodigiously 
on a variety of scientific subjects, Strakhov made his mark most memora-
bly as a literary critic and a tireless campaigner against die "nihilists" of 
die radical left. In the 1860s, the intellectual bond between Dostoevskii 
and Strakhov was very strong and their exchange of ideas lively. According 
to Strakhov, as late as 1873 Dostoevskii wrote to him: "half of my views are 
[really] your views."20 
Fedor Dostoevskii asked Strakhov to join Vremia's staff soon after they 
met in 1860. Dostoevskii himself entrusted Strakhov witii the task of stat-
ing the journal's position on the Polish Uprising, asking him to avoid ref-
erences to current political events and to strike a general tone.21 Strakhov 
18. Ellen Chances illuminates this philosophy in her work on Dostoevskii and his 
1860s journals: Chances, "Pochvennichestvo"; Chances, "Literary Criticism and the Ideology 
of Pochvennichestvo in Dostoevsky's Thick Journals Vremia and Epokha," Russian Review 
34, no. 2 (April 1975): 151-64; Chances, "Pochvennichestvo—Evolution of an Ideol-
ogy," Modern Fiction Studies20, no. 4 (Winter 1974-75): 543-51; see also her dissertation 
"The Ideology of 'Pocvennicestvo' in Dostoevskij's Journals Vremja and Epoxa" (PhD diss., 
Princeton University, 1972). For Dostoevskii's elaboration of pochvennichestvo and for 
his Vremia mission statement, see "Riad stat'ei o russkoi literature," PSS, 18:41-103 and 
19:5-66. 
19. Dolinin, "Dostoevskii i Strakhov," 238-40. 
20. N. N. Strakhov, Materiialy k biografiiDostoevskogo (1883), 238, quoted in Dolinin, 
ibid., 242. 
21. Dolinin, "Dostoevskii i Strakhov," 243; Dostoevskii's phrase was "obshchaia i ot-
vlechennaia formula." 
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did just that. Dostoevskii was proud of "A Fateful Question." He supported 
Strakhov even after the journal's closure and asked him to collaborate on 
Vremia's successor, EpokhaP 
The Puzzle of "A Fateful Question" and Its Explanations 
The author of Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov is not 
known for his sympathy for the Poles. The government's ruthless sup-
pression of die previous Polish Uprising of 1830 would have made any 
editor cautious in 1863. Given Vremia's promising publishing success, the 
stakes were high. So why would Dostoevskii go out on a limb in such a 
sensitive political moment and publish an article expressing sympathy for 
die Poles? The closing of the journal was a major financial and political 
setback for die Dostoevskii brodiers. Yet we know that Fedor Dostoevskii 
read and approved this article for publication, which would imply that he 
considered it valuable, consistent with the journal's platform, and at least 
pardy consistent widi his own views.23 On die face of it, it does not seem 
to make sense. 
The standard explanation for this apparent anomaly, based entirely 
on Dostoevskii and Strakhov's own subsequent explanations, is that die 
general public and governmental authorities misunderstood vaguely 
worded passages. In a letter to Ivan Turgenev from June 1863, Dostoevskii 
calls Strakhov's article "in the highest degree patriotic" and protests: "You 
know the direction of our journal: it is mainly a Russian direction and 
even anti-western. Would we take the Poles' side?" But he also admits that 
"diere were some infelicitous expressions and vague places [nedomolvki], 
which gave rise to false interpretations. These vague places, we now see, 
were indeed quite serious, and we are responsible for them." Dostoevskii 
had hoped, he tells Turgenev, that the journal's general orientation, by 
which he means its championship of Russian nationalism, would have 
prevented a malicious reading of these "vague places." The point of die 
article, as Dostoevskii explains it to Turgenev, was that the Poles hate the 
Russians so much that peaceful coexistence with them will long be impos-
sible. He complains diat people took it to mean that Vremia considers the 
Poles right. True, the article says that the Poles consider diemselves supe-
rior to the Russians, but—Dostoevskii assures Turgenev—it does not accept 
22. Dostoevskii's relations with Strakhov began to deteriorate after Epokha closed 
down due to low subscriptions. Scholars disagree about the degree and duration of the 
two men's affinity. In A. S. Dolinin's view, their differences were personal rather than ideo-
logical. Ibid., 253. For a view of Dostoevskii and Strakhov's relationship that stresses their 
differences, see L. M. Rozenblium, "Tvorcheskie dnevniki Dostoevskogo," Literaturnoe 
nasledstvo, vol. 83 (Moscow, 1971), 16-23. Rozenblium does not, however, disprove the 
close personal and intellectual ties that indubitably existed between them in the 1860s. 
Though their relations began to cool in the late 1860s, Strakhov was the best man at Dos-
toevskii's 1867 wedding to his second wife, Anna Grigorievna, who later asked Strakhov to 
edit Dostoevskii's posthumous collected works. Gerstein, Nikolai Strakhov, 69; Rozenblium, 
"Tvorcheskie dnevniki Dostoevskogo," 23. 
23. On Dostoevskii approving the article for publication, see Joseph Frank, Dosloevsky: 
The Stir of Liberation, 1860-1865 (Princeton, 1986), 212. 
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the Poles' view.24 Strakhov, in his biography published two decades later, 
advances the same explanation: we were misunderstood.25 
According to Strakhov, he and Dostoevskii embarked on a flurry of 
letter writing to various journals to set the record straight. Replying to 
Moskovskie vedomosti, Dostoevskii apparently complained of the public's 
incorrect interpretation and steadfasdy stood by Strakhov.26 Thanks to 
eased censorship, Strakhov proudly republished "A Fateful Question" in 
his Bor'ba s zapadom v nashei literature (The Struggle with the West in Our 
Literature, 1897), along with two rebuttals that he claimed to have sent, 
back in 1863, to Moskovskie vedomosti and Den'. The rebuttals exude a faith 
in the power of Russian culture and harsh criticisms of the haughty Poles 
that, as we will see, are absent from the original article. Instead of a genu-
ine explication of the fateful article, the rebuttals offer a manipulative 
reinterpretation that rescues Strakhov as a nationalist and exonerates him 
from the charge of political apostasy.27 
Critics, cultural historians, and biographers of Dostoevskii have 
tended to rely on Dostoevskii and Strakhov's retroactive clarifications.28 
This includes the otherwise perspicacious Joseph Frank, who sums up well 
the customary approach to "A Fateful Question": "Although intended as a 
public avowal in favor of the Russian cause, [Strakhov's article] was writ-
ten in such tortuous and elusive terms that it could easily be misread as a 
justification of the desperate Polish revolt." Frank also adds, though, that 
"Strakhov does paint Polish civilization in such glowing colors that the 
misunderstanding is quite comprehensible."29 
Scholars whose principal object of study is not Dostoevskii have been 
less invested in corroborating his and Strakhov's elucidations when exam-
ining "A Fateful Question." Gerstein has found these elucidations unreli-
able: "There is nothing particularly vague about 'Russkii's' article, and 
[Strakhov's] explanations are disingenuous. His point was that Russia, 
by the criteria which she herself accepts, did not deserve to dominate 
Poland; she would have to earn this by developing a civilized future, on 
spiritual rather dian political terms." Walicki finds in Strakhov's article 
"an impressive objectivity and even sympatiiy" for the Polish view of their 
cultural superiority over the Russians: "[Strakhov] stressed that this was 
24. Dostoevskii, letter to I. S. Turgenev of 17june 1863, PSS, 28.2:34. Dostoevskii cor-
responded with Turgenev about Turgenev's contribution to Vremia. 
25. Quoted in a commentary to Dostoevskii, letter to Turgenev, PSS, 28.2:381 n6. 
26. Since Dostoevski's manuscript is not extant, the authenticity of this letter rests 
entirely on Strakhov's testimony. He published the reply only two years after the writer's 
death, in his Materiialy k biografti Dostoevskogo (1883); see a reprint in Dostoevskii, "Otvet 
redaktsii," PSS, 20:97-101. 
27. N. N. Strakhov, Bor'ba s zapadom v nashei literature (Kiev, 1897), 2:91-120. 
28. See commentary to PSS, 20:252-55; Leonid Grossman, Dostoevsky: A Biography 
(Russian original, 1962; London, 1975), 272-75; Ronald Hingley, Dostoevsky: His Life and 
Work (London, 1978), 99; Geir Kjetsaa, FyodorDostoyevsky: A Writer's Life (1985; New York, 
1987), 147-48, Nechaeva, Zhurnal "Vremia,"305-13; V. A. Tvardovskaia, Dostoevskii v ob-
shchestvennoizhizni Rossii (Moscow, 1990), 30. 
29. Frank, Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 211-12; see also Dolinin, "K tsenzurnoi," 
2:561. 
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not merely an arrogant illusion, that the Polish superiority was not imagi-
nary but quite real." According to Olga Maiorova, Strakhov juxtaposed 
"with shocking candor" the Polish nation—"vibrant, active, possessed of 
a highly advanced culture"—with the Russian one "that remained passive 
and insufficiently developed."30 
These balanced assessments of "A Fateful Question" offer reasons to 
approach Dostoevskii and Strakhov's testimony cautiously. After all, they 
would have certainly been invested in containing the political fallout 
from the affair. The article is not "tortuous and elusive," as Frank says— 
certainly not any more or less so than anything else Vremia published or 
Strakhov wrote. It becomes "tortuous and elusive" only if we try to recon-
cile it with Dostoevskii and Strakhov's retroactive insistence that no sup-
port for the Poles was intended. In fact—and here is where I depart from 
Walicki's argument—Strakhov elaborates very good reasons why the Poles 
might wish to separate from Russia and fleetingly suggests that this may 
happen.31 Strakhov does not call for offering Poland independence, but 
his broad historiosophic discussion of Polish-Russian relations makes this 
outcome entirely reasonable. Moreover, with the exception of Gerstein, 
even recent rereadings of "A Fateful Question" maintain that Strakhov's 
true emphasis was on the Russian nation's future victory over the Pol-
ish nation, superior only superficially.32 True, Strakhov closes with hopes 
that the potential locked in the common Russian people may one day 
lead the nation to greatness, but these comments are merely hypothetical 
and timid projections rather than convinced prophesies. So anemic was 
Strakhov's assertion of Russian glory that Vladimir Kantor has recently 
surmised that it was aimed to merely mollify the censor.33 
"A Fateful Question": Textual Evidence 
Strakhov invites his readers to look at the Polish question from the Poles' 
own perspective: they consider themselves a superior, civilized culture, 
and view Russians as barbarians. Dostoevskii assured Turgenev that the 
article did not endorse the Poles' inflated self-perception but rather at-
tacked it (Strakhov's rebuttals echoed this). But this is misleading and 
untrue. In fact, Strakhov himself nearly admitted as much in a private 
conversation with Nikitenko.34 As Gerstein, Walicki, and Maiorova have 
30. Gerstein, Nikolai Strakhov, 106; Walicki, "Slavophile Thinkers," 91, 90; Maiorova, 
From the Shadow of Empire, 100. 
31. Walicki claims that Strakhov "provided strong arguments against the optimistic 
belief in the possibility of solving the Polish question through the mild treatment of the 
Poles and through offering diem material concessions." Walicki, "Slavophile Thinkers," 
91. This seems to suggest that Strakhov advocates treating die Poles harshly and offering 
them no concessions. I do not find such arguments in Strakhov's article or any encourage-
ment of such positions. 
32. Walicki, "Slavophile Thinkers," 91; Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire, 100, 
218«28. 
33. Kantor, Sankt-Peterburg, 347nl. 
34. Strakhov told Nikitenko that he had wanted "to convince the Poles not to take 
pride in 'their superiority, in their civilization that has overtaken ours' and so on, but he 
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stressed, the article supports the Poles' view of their civilizational supe-
riority in the Slavic world. "The Polish nation," Strakhov writes, "is fully 
justified to consider itself civilizationally equal to all other European na-
tions and they can hardly regard us as anything else tihan barbarians. . . . 
It is understandable," he continues, "that the Poles should look upon us 
with superiority." In fact, Strakhov claims that all Europeans are largely 
right to see Russians as underdeveloped, imitative, and ultimately alien 
to European civilization—"let us not fool ourselves," he bitterly intones. 
Though Russians are proud of their state, statehood does not substitute 
for "national life" according to Strakhov; it merely creates auspicious con-
ditions for it.35 
In demonstrating historic Polish superiority, Strakhov invokes Ivan 
Kireevskii's expertise. His quote from Kireevskii calls the Polish aristoc-
racy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with some exaggeration, 
"the most learned in Europe," stresses the Poles' knowledge of foreign 
languages and cultures and their rich tradition of translations, especially 
from the classics. Kireevskii also notes that already during Sigismund Ill's 
reign (1587-1632), Poland had eighty printing presses and over seven 
hundred known writers.36 
Contrary to Dostoevskii's and Strakhov's denials, the article portrays 
the Poles in a positive light. Strakhov refers to their struggle for indepen-
dence as "infinitely heroic," being rooted, as Walicki put it, in "the moral 
impossibility of accepting a situation in which a cultural European nation 
finds itself under the rule of uneducated barbarians."37 "The unfortunate 
nation!" Strakhov exclaims with pity: 
Given your high opinion of yourself, how strongly you must feel the en-
tire incompatibility of your position! The higher your civilization, the 
more subtle your sentiments, the more sophisticated your speech—the 
deeper your sufferings, the more insufferable appears to you any pre-
ponderance whatsoever on the side of your less civilized rivals. Your high 
culture is your punishment. Where a different tribe could have been 
pacified and subdued, you in no way can. 
Strakhov claims that the Russians have always admitted that these Polish 
sentiments have "a degree of justice" to them. He goes so far as to justify 
Poland's claims to the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories on account of 
its past civilizing successes in these areas.38 Strakhov thus flies in the face 
of Russian public opinion, which was particularly incensed by Polish in-
surgents' demands in both 1831 and 1863 for Poland's former east Slavic 
possessions that Russia now claimed as "Russian." 
So how might Russians possibly respond to the Poles? Strakhov sees 
did not fully express this idea [ne vpolne frazil elu mysl', ne doskazal ee]," see Nikitenko, 
Dnevnik, 2:340. Emphasis in the original. 
35. N. N. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 153, 155, 154. 
36. Ibid., 153-54. Strakhov quotes from I. V. Kireevskii, "Obzor sovremennogo sos-
toianiia literatury," Polnoe sobranie sochinenii Ivana Vasil'evicha Kireevskogp (Moscow, 1861), 
2:30. 
37. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 155; Walicki, "Slavophile Thinkers," 90. 
38. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 155, 157. 
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two possibilities: 1) to prove that Russians are not in fact barbarians, or 
2) to prove that Polish civilization is "not genuine, but carries death in 
its very root."39 The second phrase became Strakhov's refrain in his cam-
paigns of self-defense. Dostoevskii invokes it to Turgenev when denying 
that Vremia pronounced Polish culture superior to the Russian. Nothing 
of the sort, Dostoevskii argues: "we said it literally, that the praised Polish 
civilization has carried and carries death in its heart. This we said in our 
article literally."40 
But they did not. Although this statement about Polish civilization's 
deadened core is the most conducive to Dostoevskii and Strakhov's rein-
terpretations, it is hypothetical rather than declarative. It appears along-
side the equally plausible possibility that Russians are barbarians—the 
very claim that Dostoevskii and Strakhov later try to erase. Because its 
national development is in an early phase, Russia as yet cannot, in Stra-
khov's opinion, deny a charge of "barbarity." It can only muster negative 
evidence: it did not become Polonized and it bypassed Poland when west-
ernizing. Alas, Strakhov soberly concludes, this "negative evidence" only 
proves that Russians have preserved themselves intact and are now "ready" 
to develop their nationality. But he warns that "more than that cannot 
be concluded from this."41 Strakhov is basically a skeptical patriot. Like 
Chaadaev, he wished for Russia's national coherence and confidence, yet 
was unwilling to fudge the evidence to prematurely proclaim this goal as 
accomplished. 
Confronting the second possibility, Strakhov wonders if the Poles' 
civilization, in view of their loss of independence, was indeed sickly and 
abnormal. "If we suppose this," Strakhov hypothetically continues, "we 
might point to Polish civilization's un-Slavic foreignness and its lack of 
grounding in the life of the people." The trouble is that Strakhov instantly 
snips this line of inquiry and, moreover, suggests that this is Russians' 
wishful thinking, a mere consolation in which they should be indulged: 
"Let us judge the matter this way and comfort ourselves with the thought 
that the fate of Poland is its inevitable inner fate. But such consolations 
are only part of the matter [Ne v takikh utesheniiakh vse delo] ."42 
This "consolation" clarifies the article's importance for Dostoevskii as 
Vremia's editor. As a hypothetical exercise, the notion of Polish civilization's 
deadened core offers an instructive lesson for Russia to resist the kind 
of westernization that may have deracinated the Poles and severed their 
nobility's link to the people. This smacks, of course, of Dostoevskii's po-
chvennichestvo, Vremia's underlying ideology. This moment also clarifies 
Vremia's and—by extension, Dostoevskii's—apparent championship of 
the Poles. It is absolutely essential to understand that the Poles' fate is 
quite secondary to the lessons it might offer to Russian nationalism. As 
for Katkov, the "fateful question" from the title is less about Poland than 
39. Ibid., 158. 
40. Dostoevskii, letter to Turgenev, PSS, 28.2:34. Emphasis in the original. 
41. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 159, 160. 
42. Ibid., 160. 
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about Russia. In fact, this title links both Katkov's editorial and Strakhov's 
article to Aleksandr Pushkin's seminal interrogative from his 1831 poem 
"Klevetnikam Rossii" (To the Slanderers of Russia). Pushkin penned the 
poem in a historically homologous moment—at the time of the 1831 
Polish November Uprising. In it, he famously asks: "Will Slavic streams 
unite in a Russian sea? / Will it dry up? That is the question [Slavianskie I' 
ruch'i sol'iutsia v russkom more1? / Ono I' issiaknet? vol vopros]." For Strakhov 
and Dostoevskii, in 1863, the Polish question puts in equally sharp focus 
the existential question about the Russian empire, its fitness, direction, 
and European prestige. In this, they seem to echo my epigraph's author, 
Nikitenko.43 
Yet Strakhov values the needs of the Russian nation over those of the 
Russian empire more than Pushkin did. The article does not defend the 
Poles but promotes Dostoevskii's brand of Russian nationalism. Vremiauses 
the Polish question merely to do what it had always been doing: prodding 
the Russians to become more Russian and affirming each nation's right to 
organic development. Only once Russia develops its own national culture 
will it become an equal of European ones. Only then, Strakhov adds, will 
Russia's claim to the Ukrainian-Belorussian rim trump the Polish one.44 
In closing, Strakhov articulates two tasks that will help resolve the "fate-
ful question." The Russians must devote themselves to developing a truly 
national culture that is harmonious with their inner spirit. The Poles must 
renounce their pride because it leads to demands that may not be satis-
fied, in pursuit of which they bear undue sacrifices. 
Reading Strakhov's article forces us to consider Dostoevskii's com-
plaints about misunderstanding as an unconvincing attempt at damage 
control. In my view, Dostoevskii's and Strakhov's explanations belong 
to the Russian tradition of political apologia offered after offending the 
country's national pride. This tradition includes Chaadaev's 1837 "Apolo-
giia sumasshedshego" (Apology of a Madman), which elucidated and re-
canted his "Philosophical Letter" as well as Nikolai Gogol"s explanatory 
texts to his Government Inspector and Dead Souls, works whose nationalism 
the public found to be suspect.45 The public in fact understood the article 
well but focused on what for Strakhov and Dostoevskii was secondary: the 
culture of the Poles and its comparison to Russian culture. For the Vremia 
editors this was a preliminary step toward an argument about the Russian 
nation. But the public was less interested in that argument and saw the 
comments about superior Polish civilization as treason and political folly. 
Beyond its blow to triumphalist, state-centered nationalism and to the 
sensitivities of a public reared in its spirit, the article had very uncomfort-
able implications for Russia's imperial ideology. Given Russia's imperial 
43. Historical research corroborates the immense importance of the so-called Polish 
Question. Even without a Polish uprising on his hands, Alexander III devoted 30 percent 
of all his decisions to the management of Poland. See A. Miller and M. Dolbilov, eds., 
Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow, 2006), 436. 
44. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 161. 
45. Edyta M. Bojanowska, Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2007), 197-210, 236-53. 
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stature, Strakhov's stark contrast between Polish civilization and Russian 
barbarity sounded provocative. In the pan-European schema that Stra-
khov never questions, empires typically claimed superiority over their 
peripheries. The noble task of leading the subordinated peoples toward 
progress made the dirty business of conquest and rule compatible with 
the metropole's view of its own righteousness. Yet Strakhov denies Russia's 
superiority. Consistent with Vremia's prophecies of Russia's future national 
glory, Strakhov hopes that Russia mil eventually attain this advantage, 
that is, a unique, organic national culture that would attract surrounding 
"tribes." He intimates that when this happens, Russia's native, Slavic civi-
lization may overshadow the Europeanized Polish one. 
But Strakhov presents this process as "long and arduous [vekovaia 
bor'ba]."46 So what now justifies Russia's sovereignty over the Poles? Must 
they wait patiently in the imperial fold as Russians work on acquiring the 
right to rule them? These were the logical and politically risky questions 
raised by the article. Strakhov's handling of the dichotomy between "civi-
lized" Poles and "barbarous" Russians made it seem that Polish claims to 
independence were justified. He even intimates that they might become 
realized when he prefaces one remark with the hypothetical, "Even if Po-
land were independent. . . [Dazhe v torn sluchae, kogda by Pol'sha byla neza-
visima . . . ] . " 4 7 This was political apostasy, since the official discourse did 
not admit an alternative to a triumphant reestablishment of Russian rule 
in Poland.48 Overall, Strakhov offers no practical political solutions, but 
any reader would be justified to see in his article an implicit support for 
the rebel cause and a critique of the government's policy. 
By publishing Strakhov's article, could Dostoevskii have supported 
Polish independence and the shrinking of the Russian empire's western 
dominions? Anyone familiar with his later views on Russia's relations with 
the Slavic world might doubt this. A Writers Diary, especially its entries 
about the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, strikes a very different tone. 
Dostoevskii, by then a revered national prophet, adamantly proclaimed 
Russia's leadership in the Slavic world and its "manifest destiny" to gather 
all the less fortunate, that is, stateless, Slavs. The Russia of A Writer's Diary 
is a confident, expansionist Russia that never retreats and never questions 
its mission civilisatrice. But, as is well known, the Dostoevskii of the early 
1860s was ideologically more liberal than the Dostoevskii of the late 1870s 
and beyond. Could he have had a different national-imperial program in 
the early 1860s? 
"A Fateful Question" and Its Journalistic Convoy 
Vremia's, general coverage of the Polish Uprising shows that this was likely 
the case. Brief reports on military clashes in Poland appear as early as die 
46. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 162. 
47. Ibid. 
48. As early as 1861, a censorship circular forbade any hints of Polish autonomy, let 
alone independence. Renner, "Defining a Russian Nation," 672n52. 
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January 1863 issue. Avoiding any predictable Pole-bashing, the account 
in the section "Sovremennoe obozrenie" (Contemporary Survey) simply 
regrets the spilling of "brotherly blood" on both sides and hopes that the 
disturbances will not escalate.49 In February Vremia abandons any report-
ing of news from the ground, which the government made amply avail-
able, perhaps signaling its distrust of official sources.50 The next two issues 
focus instead on western European governments' responses to the con-
flict, particularly the likelihood of their military and financial aid to the 
Poles, which worried Russian officials and public opinion in the uprising's 
early months.51 
The March issue reports favorably and at length on a speech by a 
Mr. Billeaud ("Bil'o" in Cyrillic) who apparendy advocated French nonin-
volvement from the floor of the French Senate. Billeaud praises Alexander 
II's reforms, which put Russia on the course of "civilization and progress." 
He argues that Polish affairs distract Russia's attention from this worthy 
domestic agenda, especially its transition from serfdom, whose success, in 
the final analysis, outweighs any benefit that may accrue to Russia from its 
control of Poland. Vremia thus cites a foreign source to raise the contro-
versial idea that renouncing Poland may in fact benefit Russia.52 
Indeed, Billeaud's remarks anticipate the position of Vremia's next, 
fateful issue of April 1863, which openly opposed the government's han-
dling of the Polish Uprising. To say that Vremia sympathized with Polish 
demands for independence would sound misleadingly idealistic. Rather, 
Vremia framed its recommendation in terms of ridding Russia's body of a 
festering limb. The larger textual package of the entire issue indicates that 
Strakhov's article forms part of a well-articulated and coherent platform 
on the Polish Question and on the politics of the imperial state. Roughly 
three-fourths of the 260-page section "Sovremennoe obozrenie" relates in 
some way to these issues. This thematic focus and the texts' mutual con-
sistency suggest a conscious editorial decision and a bold political gamble 
by the Dostoevskii brothers. It is a gamble they promptly lost. The mission 
proved politically suicidal because it collided with the government's policy 
of maintaining imperial possessions at all cost. 
The articles surrounding "A Fateful Question" provide the political ap-
plications to Strakhov's theoretical-cultural schema and collectively drive 
home Vremia's point: the war costs Russia millions of rubles and thou-
sands of lives. Given the Poles' intransigence, these resources would be 
better spent on domestic needs, preeminent among them land financing 
for recently liberated serfs (their obligation to remunerate landlords for 
the land was widely seen as a de facto continuation of serfdom). Vremia's 
inclination to let Poland go was thus motivated—and this is key—not by 
idealistic solidarity with the Polish cause but by nationalist concerns for 
Russia's welfare, concerns that animate the journal's larger critique of the 
49. Vremia, no. 1 (1863): 64. 
50. See the 1863 report of the Third Section, quoted in VS. Nechaeva, ZhurnalM. M. 
iF. M. Dostoevskikh "Epokha," 1864-1865 (Moscow, 1975), 6 (hereafter Zhurnal "Epokha"). 
51. Vremia, no. 2 (1863): 183-94 and no. 3 (1863): 128-32. 
52. Vremia, no. 3 (1863): 139-40. 
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imperial state. Vremia wanted the Russian nation to have greater control 
over the imperial state, which should represent the nation's values and 
interests. The April issue suggests that a measure of peripheral autonomy 
would protect imperial integrity better than the coercive tactics practiced 
so far by the metropole. Vremia clearly worried—as did many Russians 
at die time—that Russia's imperial expansion impeded its growth as a 
nation.53 
"A Fateful Question" is therefore not an anomaly in an otherwise po-
litically correct issue. On the contrary, Strakhov's article fits integrally 
within the larger matrix of Vremia. Strakhov did not need to state outright 
that Russia should extricate itself from Poland because the domestic and 
international news segments that directly follow his article do just that. 
Though unsigned, both segments were authored by Vremia's permanent 
political analyst Aleksei E. Razin, who was highly prized by the Dostoevskii 
brothers.54 While Strakhov provides a cultural and historical justification 
for disengagement, the news sections chime in with pragmatics.55 
Razin's "Our Home Affairs" defends Russian suzerainty over the pre-
dominantly Orthodox and "Russian" Western Provinces (comprising the 
Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian territories), to which Poland lay 
claims. The Polish kingdom, he writes, is a different matter: ethnically 
Polish, overwhelmingly Catholic, run by Polish civil servants, and served 
by a host of separate institutions. Razin sees only two ways of dealing with 
it. One is to erase Poland's autonomy and effect a complete political and 
institutional merger with Russia. The other is to cut Russia's losses and 
abandon the Polish kingdom while keeping the Western Provinces. This 
clearly emerges as a preferred, pragmatic solution. The Poles have ex-
hausted Russia; they are a "painful ulcer" that should be speedily cut off, 
only without the meddling of west Europeans: 
Common sense dictates getting rid of this painful ulcer [boleznennyi 
narost] as fast as possible, by means of an operation, if necessary. How-
ever, Russia does not wish for . . . someone else to perform this opera-
tion. History tends toward the gradual smoothing out of national an-
tagonisms. But this is the more easily accomplished die less one uses 
violence... . Russia entered the path of "expanding social rights" and of 
"broadening the scope of activity entrusted to the empire's various local 
institutions." There is no doubt whatsoever uhat once diis path becomes 
more clearly and tangibly marked, all Slavs—on tiieir own, without any 
efforts or sacrifices on our part—will cling to Russia with full sympathy.56 
Then Poland will join Russia of its own will, perhaps will beg for it. And 
rauher dian a weakness, Poland will tiien represent the strength of the 
53. See Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1997); and Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire. 
54. Nechaeva, Zhurnal "Epokha," 74. 
55. For the segment devoted to the Polish affairs, see Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 190-97. 
56. Dostoevskii later propounds the same scenario for all Slavs; see F. M. Dostoevsky, 
A Writer's Diary, ed. and trans. Kenneth Lantz, vol. 1, 1873-1876 and vol. 2, 1877-1881 
(Evanston, 1993-94), l:522-31and 2:1099-1205, 1206-12. 
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great Slavic union. The key is that this must happen by itself, naturally, 
and completely voluntarily.57 
Renouncing Poland does not mean renouncing empire, the article 
claims, thus disagreeing with the government's view of Poland as die em-
pire's linchpin. All Slavs will eventually join Russia, but the union must 
be voluntary if it is to be strong. In light of what happened later—Rus-
sia's ruthless quashing of the uprising, severe reprisals against the insur-
gents, and the policy of depolonization under Mikhail "The Hangman" 
Muravev—the notion of renouncing the Kingdom of Poland while hold-
ing on to the Western Provinces sounds radical. Nevertheless, profound 
skepticism that the Poles would ever reconcile themselves to Russian rule 
was widespread in the uprising's early stages, giving rise to serious con-
sideration of this option even in government circles. Vremia made die 
mistake of voicing it publicly. Months later even Kadcov frames the two 
solutions to the Polish Question as the choice between total incorporation 
and partial decolonization.58 
In his international news segment, Razin reiterates these two solu-
tions, predicting that if Poland's complete unification with Russia is im-
possible, "Russia will completely get rid of Poland [izbavitsia otPol'shi], on 
which are unnecessarily wasted both millions [of rubles] and many tens of 
thousands of lives."59 Indeed, the tremendous cost of keeping Poland was 
hotly debated at the time by government officials and die public.60 The 
mention of needlessly spilt Russian blood and a colossal waste of money 
echoes both Razin's domestic news segment and "A Fateful Question."61 
Razin argues that the money spent on the Polish adventure could have 
paid for the liberated serfs' land and made Russian economy, arts, and 
sciences flourish. 
The next and final article in the issue, P. P. Sokal'skii's provocative 
"Nashi glavnnye spornye punkty" (Our Main Points of Contention), ar-
gues that the state should get out of the business of managing nationalities 
altogether. Strakhov sees the state as irrelevant, but Sokal'skii claims diat 
it is harmful. In his view, politicians play irresponsibly with nationalities, 
not realizing that violence and despotism only breed hatred. Sokal'skii is 
adamant diat imperial states must be voluntary unions, based on mutual 
respect and "love." Tolerance need not lead to the demise of the Russian 
57. Vremia, no. 4(1863): 197. 
58. Miller and Dolbilov, eds., Zapadnye okrainy, 182. See Kautov's leading article in Mos-
kovskie vedomosti 228 (1863). In the next issue, Katkov clarifies diat retreating from Poland 
would be a terrible mistake; see Sobranieperedovykh statei "Moskovskikh vedomostei" (Moscow, 
1863-1887), 623-26. In private letters to Alexander II and Alexander III, however, Katkov 
apparently favored giving Poland independence "within its edinographic boundaries"; see 
Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism (Budapest, 2008), 170. 
59. Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 220. 
60. Ekaterina Pravilova, Finansy imperii: Den'gi i vlast' v politike Rossii na natsional'nykh 
okrainakh, 1801-1917 (Moscow, 2006), 137-51, 165-99. 
61. Strakhov, "Rokovoi vopros," 155, and Razin's mention of "broshennye miliony" in 
Vremia, no. 4(1863): 195. 
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empire. A gender touch will ensure, Sokal'skii here echoes Razin, that 
other nationalities will cling to Russia of their own free will. They will see 
diat "life is good under our patronage and will firmly join us."62 Vremia 
basically rejects institutional and coercive Russification and favors instead 
creating conditions for "Russianization" (obrusenie) or a "self-chosen" act 
of spontaneous cultural assimilation.63 This fit within the contemporary 
ideal of grazhdanstvennost', or the creation of the imperial civil society.64 
Needless to say, all of this constituted a political program that challenged 
the government's treatment, not only of Poles (who are barely mentioned, 
if clearly implied), but also of other imperial minorities.65 
Sokal'skii articulates a coherent, theoretically grounded alternative to 
the state's imperial policy. He never addresses specific recommendations 
to the Russian government, but his aim is obvious: Russia should reject co-
ercion and militarism, which produce only ephemeral results, in favor of 
what may be termed a consensual empire. He argues that the state should 
not interfere in the lives of nationalities or try to amalgamate them by 
force. They should be free to develop and compete in the realm of culture 
so that, ultimately, "the stronger civilization will take the upper hand and 
the task of progress will be accomplished freely."66 Tolerance for constitu-
ent nationalities is a must in Sokal'skii's vision of an empire by consent. 
He insists that, contrary to popular assumptions, such an empire would 
strengthen the state. For this empire to emerge, however, Russia must 
develop its inner spiritual resources and national self-knowledge. This to 
Sokal'skii represents Russia's true epochal task and its only guarantee of 
progress. 
Many other articles in the March and April issues of Vremia obliquely 
promote such organic national work, making the empire self-sustaining 
and basing it on the consent of its constituent ethnicities. A. Bibikov criti-
cized the army's Byzantine bureaucracy and bloated budget, campaign-
ing for decentralization, cost-cutting, and genuine civilian controls over 
military expenditures. The ongoing military operation in Poland and the 
well-known fact that the military draft there helped spark the uprising 
correlate Bibikov's discussion of army reforms with the Polish imbroglio. 
62. P. P. Sokal'skii, "Nashi glavnnye spornye punkty," Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 257. 
63. Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London, 2003), 66, 
19. See also Miller, Romanov Empire, 49-52. On institutional Russification in Poland, see 
Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the 
Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, 1996). 
64. According to Dov Yaroshevski, grazhdanstvennost' became prominent in Russian 
political culture between 1857 and 1867; see Yaroshevski, "Empire and Citizenship," in 
Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzarini, eds., Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 
1700-1917 (Bloomington, 1997), 65. 
65. For example, Sokal'skii harangues against the persecution of the Ukrainian 
language—a policy that conservative papers supported (e.g., Den' or Biblioteka dlia 
chteniia). He claims that the Russians are hypocritical in defending the national rights of 
the Czechs, the Serbs, or the Slovaks, that is, Slavs who happen to reside in other empires, 
while restricting these same rights at home; see Sokal'skii, "Nashi," 254. 
66. Sokal'skii, "Nashi," 232-33. 
67. N. Bibikov, "Terriorial'naia voennaia sistema," Vremia, no. 3 (1863): 1-16 and 
no. 4 (1893): 46-62. Apart from the burden of hosting and supplying an enormous Rus-
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P. Tkachev's "Nashi budushchie prisiazhnye" (Our Future Jurors) takes 
up the cause of empowering die people vis-a-vis the state through a trial 
by jury, which is seen as the only guarantee of a nation's political rights.68 
This would help counteract the "voicelessness" (bezmolvie) of the people 
that M. Rodevich decries as the fundamental condition of Russian society 
in the post-Petrine era. Rodevich describes the relation of Russian sub-
jects to their state as passive spectatorship of a "public gathered around an 
air balloon" or a swarm of insects around a giant, who notices the insects' 
existence only when stung.69 The article recounts historical examples of 
Russia's absolute rulers' abuses of the people, including arbitrary depri-
vations of life and private property. The leitmotif of die nation's "voice-
lessness" reverberates in the article as a call to Russians to demand to be 
heard. Addressing explicitly imperial questions, Vasilii P. Popov's April 
article "Prestuplenia i nakazania" (Crimes and Punishments) chastises the 
British empire for exiling criminals to far-off colonies and using corporal 
punishment. This could easily be read as Aesopian criticism of Russia's 
own widespread use of colonial exile: "A nation that proudly holds itself 
as the head of civilization indulges in barbarity that is fit for savages!"70 
Strakhov's article, which similarly questions Russia's pretensions to "civi-
lization" and asserts its penchant for "barbarity," begins only three pages 
after these words. Popov's review sees neither correctional nor colonial 
benefit in exiling prisoners to peripheral regions and argues that volun-
tary colonization should replace exile.71 
The final companion piece to "A Fateful Question" worthy of note is 
a long review of Mykola Kostomarov's Istoriia severnykh narodopravstv (A 
History of Northern Republics, 1863), warmly greeted in a footnote by 
the journal's editors. Kostomarov was a Ukrainian historian and a vocal 
supporter of imperial federalism.72 Such federalism, according to Kosto-
marov, was rooted in Kievan Rus' and meant that "independent parts . . . 
without suspending their separate existence, all joindy formed one state 
body." The review details federalism's workings in the medieval city-states 
of Novgorod and Pskov, which involved free elections and citizens' influ-
sian army stationed in Poland (many times that of the British military presence in Ire-
land), die draft was a permanent source of Polish discontent. According to recent Polish 
research, of the 200,000 Poles drafted in 1831-1873, 150,000 died while in service. See 
Miller and Dolbilov, eds., Zapadnye okrainy, 442. 
68. P. Tkachev, "Nashi budushchie prisiazhnye," Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 103-20. 
69. M. Rodevich, "Nekotorye cherty iz istorii poslepetrovskogo vremeni," Vremia, 
no. 4 (1863): 65, 68-69. Rodevich was Vremia's permanent collaborator. 
70. V. P. Popov, "Prestuplenia i nakazania," Vremia, no. 4 (1863): 149. The article 
subsequently played a role in the genesis of Dostoevskii's Crime and Punishment. Chances 
notes Vremia's use of Aesopian language in her "Pochvennichestvo," 79. 
71. Given Vremia's popular serialization of Dostoevskii's House of the Dead, which the 
public knew was based on the author's personal experience of exile, diis issue would cer-
tainly have been seen to enjoy the writer's personal endorsement. 
72. On Kostomarov's federalism, see Alexei Miller, "Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei 
i russkom obshchestvennonm mnenii (vtoraia polovina 19veka) (St. Petersburg, 2000), 76-115, 
and Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire, 75-81. Katkov vehemently opposed Kostomarov's 
federalism, so this review may have helped in getting Vremia's April issue on his bad side 
(on Katkov and Ukraine, see Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov, 131-33). 
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ence on public affairs. Printed anonymously, the review was authored by 
P. V Znamenskii, a future historian of medieval Rus', who sympathizes with 
the fierce independence of ethnic, political, and kinship factions within 
the city-states and paints their federal union as a viable "national ideal" 
(narodnyi ideal). He presents the city-states' incorporation into Muscovy 
as a violent solution that truncated an organic historical process.73 The 
review's examples smack of a messy, nascent democracy, which contrasts 
sharply with the "voicelessness" of Rodevich's Russians during the post-
Petrine period. Znamenskii comes close to calling for the continuation of 
the interrupted business of federalism.74 
In short, the final issue of Vremia stages a concerted effort to put the 
interests of the Russian nation above those of the Russian empire and to 
propose an alternative vision of this empire: one based on tolerance and 
consent of the governed minorities. Under the guise of history, Vremia as-
serts the idea of federalism as a viable ideal organically rooted in Russian 
history. Possible territorial losses incurred in pursuit of a consensual—or 
federal—empire will prove temporary; a stronger domestic core will even-
tually buttress the empire. Many articles critique the costly and ineffec-
tive current imperial policy, which relies on coercion and war. Strakhov's 
contribution dismantles the classic Russian justification for imperial sov-
ereignty over Poland. The issue's other articles, unfazed by the prospect 
of an independent Poland, advocate a halt to the violent suppression of 
the Polish Uprising. The underlying sentiment—this merits emphasis—is 
not sympathy for the Poles, but concern for the Russian nation's welfare 
and the empire's viability. To use a modern metaphor, Vremia wants to 
press the "reset" button in the empire's management. 
What Does Vremia Tell Us about Fedor Dostoevskii? 
The postexile period up to the spring of 1863 represents a time when Dos-
toevskii experimented with alternative and unorthodox ideas about the 
Russian empire—ideas that the April 1863 issue of Vremiaputs into focus. 
This episode reveals a stage in the evolution of Dostoevskii's national and 
imperial ideology so far unnoted in the scholarship. Dostoevskii's inter-
est in imperial politics predates by far the punditry of his Writer's Diary 
phase. He appears, moreover, to have supported the shrinking of the Rus-
sian empire in the west. He believed that an expensive imperial agenda 
drained resources from more crucial domestic priorities, such as educa-
tion and land reform. 
While Vremia's ill-fated April 1863 issue thus modifies our understand-
ing of this specific moment in Dostoevskii's ideological evolution, it also 
73. [P. V. Znamenskii] (signed M. N.), "Eshche stat'ia o novoi knige," Vremia, no. 4 
(1863): 4, 27-28. On Znamenskii's authorship, see Nechaeva, Zhurnal "Vremia, "200-201. 
74. The ideas of both federalism and empire by consent were confidentially debated 
in high government circles. Minister of the Interior Valuev reportedly weighed federal-
ism's viability for Russia. Katkov insinuated this when he inveighed in Moskovskie vedomosti 
against high-placed government officials who wanted to transform Russia into a confed-
eration; see Sleznev and Smolin, "Velikii strazh imperii," 24. 
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calls into question the very model of this evolution, proposed by Joseph 
Frank's influential five-volume biography of the writer. Taking his cue 
from Dostoevskii's own statement that the exile caused a "regeneration" 
of his convictions, Frank makes the exile the fundamental caesura of the 
writer's biography, which marks off Dostoevskii the revolutionary liberal 
from Dostoevskii the religious and national conservative.75 Although the 
exile was undoubtedly transformative, this sharp division of die writer's 
intellectual biography in the end obscures what in truth was a more grad-
ual process of ideological evolution with multiple inflection points, rever-
sals, and significant continuities. The January Uprising and the trauma 
of Vremia's shutdown were for the writer one such ^osfexile moment of 
crisis, introspection, and rethinking of his political positions. Dostoevskii's 
nationalism up to the Polish Uprising of 1863 was not very conservative. 
The Vremia affair shows a Dostoevskii who, despite the idiosyncrasy of his 
motives, had more in common with liberals such as Herzen than with con-
servative nationalists such as Katkov—a possibility to which Frank does in 
fact remain alert at other junctures of his biography of Dostoevskii and 
for which Chances had earlier argued.76 Vremia's final issue documents 
Dostoevskii's openness to radical solutions regarding Russia's domestic 
and foreign policy that escapes the postexile "regeneration" model. To 
the extent that Dostoevskii's support for disengagement from Poland was 
formed in interactions with Poles during exile—as I think it was—then 
the shutdown of Vremia led him to reverse a conviction formed during 
exile. 
Of course, one cannot assume that any idea printed in Vremia en-
joyed Fedor Dostoevskii's personal support. We do know, however, that 
he did the heavy lifting of editing and shepherding submissions through 
censorship (his brother mainly looked after the business side of things). 
He worked hard to put the April issue together. He personally solicited, 
read, and supported Strakhov's article. The editors did not distance them-
selves from the views expressed, an option they did exercise on other oc-
casions.77 The degree of focus and mutual consistency in the constellation 
of ideas regarding die Polish and imperial questions signal a conscious 
editorial move. The cogency and focus of Vremia's April issue is unlikely 
to have been a matter of chance. Its general agenda must have met with 
Dostoevskii's approval. 
Dostoevskii's unpublished comments about the uprising and Poland 
did come down to us in his "Notebook for 1863-1864." These comments, 
however, follow the scandal of "A Fateful Question" by roughly a year, 
showing us a Dostoevskii who was already reacting to the crisis, reevaluat-
ing and modifying his positions. Still, these notes reveal a fluid adjustment 
75. See, e.g., Joseph Frank, The Years of Ordeal, 1850-1859 (Princeton, 1983), 87-88. 
76. Chances, "Pochvennichestvo," 73. 
77. See, for example, the editors' footnote to [A. A. Grigor'ev], "O postepennom, no 
bystrom i povsemestnom rasprostranenii nevezhestva i bezgramotnosti v rossiiskoi sloves-
nosti," Vremia, no. 3 (1861): 39; on Grigor'ev's likely authorship, see Nechaeva, Zhurnal 
"Epokha, "236, 262wl9. 
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rather than a complete reversal of the political sentiments of April 1863. 
Here is a selection from Dostoevskii's "Notebook": 
1. By freeing the peasants in Poland and giving them land, Russia thus 
shared its idea with Poland, inculcated Poland witii its own character, 
and diis idea is a link [tsep'] by which Poland and Russia are now insepa-
rably united. 
2. Whoever defends too strongly die unity that Russia achieves by vio-
lent means, no matter what, doubts die power of the Russian spirit, does 
not understand it, and if he understands it, then clearly wishes it ill. I 
myself will support the political unity of Uiis mass [gromada] to die last 
drop of my blood, because this is the only good result of Russia's thou-
sand years of suffering. But mis is not die main thing: (what is die main 
tiling). 
3. Universality [obshchechelovechnost'] can only be achieved through each 
nation's insistence on its own nationality. The idea ofpochva, of nationali-
ties, is the basis. The idea of nationality is a new form of democracy. 
4. The Polish war is a war of two forms of Christianity—it is the begin-
ning of a future war between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, or, in odier 
words, between Slavic genius and European civilization. And so: our de-
velopment, but not of die official kind (on the Dutch program), but a 
national one [narodnoe] .78 
These notes show Dostoevskii's evolving views on the Polish and im-
perial questions that resonate with ideas from Vremia while avoiding a 
collision course with the authorities, which the editors of Epokha could 
not afford. Strakhov found nothing in the way of civilizational benefit to 
Poland from Russia's imperial sovereignty. After Alexander II's edict of 
19 February 1864, which freed Poland's serfs and gave them land, Dos-
toevskii seems to have found this benefit (entry 1, above) .79 The liberation 
of the Polish serfs represents an idea that Dostoevskii and Strakhov would 
like to see as cementing the empire: idea instead of war (entry 2). It is the 
kind of idea diat in April 1863 they apparendy could not find and that the 
very minister who banned Vremia apparently could not find either.80 Dos-
toevskii also brings up Orthodoxy, absent in Vremia's coverage, which in a 
future showdown of civilizations will guarantee Russia's spiritual triumph 
not only over Poland but also over Europe. And yet he echoes Vremia's 
April issue in making this triumph contingent upon Russia's internal work 
78. Literaturnoe nasledstvo, vol. 83 (Moscow, 1971), 176, 186. Emphasis in the origi-
nal. Entry 1 from between 16 April and die end of June 1864; entries 2 to 4 from August 
1864. 
79. The Polish insurgents had been promising die liberation of the serfs from die 
start. The tsar's edict was widely regarded as a testament to Russia's military challenges: an 
effort to weaken peasant support for Polish independence. 
80. See P. A. Valuev's diary entry for 6 December 1863: "We all seek a moral force on 
which we can rely, but do not find it. One cannot defeat moral forces with a purely material 
force. Irrespective of all die foolishness and duplicity of the Poles, the ideas are on dieir 
side. On ours—not a single one. [. . .] We talk of Russian rule or Orthodoxy. But these 
ideas are for us, not for the Poles, and we ourselves invoke these words insincerely. Russia 
itself is not the point here, but the Russian autocrat, the Polish king, and the constitutional 
Finnish Grand Prince. This is not an idea, but an anomaly. What is needed is an idea diat 
even a single Pole could accept as his own [usvoit' sebe]." Dnevnik P. A. Valueva, 1:258-59. 
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of building national consciousness (entry 4). Nationalism, in turn, has 
democratizing functions (here modern theorists would agree)—just as 
Vremia's historical articles show (entry 3). All in all, Dostoevskii now em-
phatically supports the inviolable integrity of the empire, though he does 
not finish his thought why "this is not the main thing" (entry 2). All this 
comes a year after the Vremia disaster, however. 
Although Dostoevskii's late work, A Writer's Diary, reveals a shift in his 
political positions, it too echoes certain ideas expressed in Vremia's final 
issue. When celebrating the 1881 Russian capture of the Turkmen fortress 
Geok Tepe in A Writer's Diary, Dostoevskii comes full circle to the notion of 
reorienting the Russian empire, whose civilizing mission, he claims, lies in 
Asia, not on its western frontier.81 Though Poland is not mentioned, any 
such reorientation would necessarily involve it. Again, this puts Vremia's 
idea of an empire free from the "Polish ulcer" within Dostoevskii's ideo-
logical perimeter. The 1873 entry "Mechty i grezy" (Dreams and Musings), 
much like Vremia a decade earlier, ponders the cost of empire and recom-
mends reallocating the military budget to education.82 This shows impor-
tant continuities with Vremia's platform in the least likely of sources. 
The idea of empire by consent also fits integrally with other aspects 
of Dostoevskii's postexile ideology. Nancy Ruttenburg has recently ex-
plored Dostoevskii's intense interest in the idea of democracy by analyz-
ing The House of the Dead (the fiction that ran in Vremia a year prior). She 
claims that following his exile in a crowded prison camp, "Dostoevskii 
envisioned a new world in which [a] mandated physical proximity would 
have been converted into a consensual national-spiritual unity, the basis 
of his democratic vision."83 Ruttenburg also demonstrates that, in Dos-
toevskii's view, social life based on "common consent" was deeply rooted 
in the Russian people.84 In promoting Vremia's model of a consensual em-
pire, Dostoevskii may have thus merely extended the homegrown Russian 
ideal of "common consent," consistent widi his pochvennichestvo ideal 
of reorganizing Russian life in line with Russian national values. Vremia's 
new imperial model simply applies to a larger political arena die prin-
ciple of Russian democracy that Ruttenburg traces in illuminating detail 
in Dostoevskii's prison-camp fiction. After all, as his aphoristic statement 
from the "Notebook" shows, early Dostoevskii viewed national aspirations 
in terms of legitimate democratic demands: "The idea of nationality is a 
new form of democracy." 
The authorities promptly stepped in to make sure that this vision— 
including calls for consensual empire, its subordination to die needs of 
the Russian nation, and noises about federalism—would not be propa-
gated. Vremia wanted the people to be citizens of the empire; the govern-
ment treated them as imperial subjects. Vremia wanted an empire based 
on civic institutions; the government wanted one based on the army and 
81. Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, 2:1368-78. Dostoevskii may have begun developing 
this notion as early as 1864, see Nechaeva, Zhurnal "Epokha, "65-67. 
82. Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, 2:1368-78, 1:234-40. 
83. Ruttenburg, Dostoevsky's Democracy, 166. 
84. Ibid., 25. 
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the police. The Dostoevskii brothers understood this and retreated, likely 
prompted by some combination of a genuine change of heart and the 
pragmatics of practicing journalism in a repressive state. Even the censors 
found Vremia's successor, Epokha, anodyne, noting its rapproachment with 
the Slavophile Den' and Katkov's Moskovskie vedomosti—the very journals 
that brought Vremia down.85 
The experience of penal servitude in a multiethnic Siberian prison 
camp on the border with Central Asia no doubt prompted Dostoevskii 
to reflect on Russia's imperial course, just as a journey to Sakhalin later 
tempered Anton Chekhov's heady support of Russia's colonial mission.86 
While in Omsk, Dostoevskii gained firsthand experience of the phenom-
enon that Beth Holmgren has recently dubbed "the indigestible Pole."87 
In fact, The House of the Dead, which describes Polish inmates, offers addi-
tional evidence why Vremia's final issue, far from being a reckless editorial 
oversight, reflected Dostoevskii's own politics. This fictionalized autobiog-
raphy suggests that Dostoevskii found the Russification of "indigestible" 
Poles doomed and not worth the effort. Of all ethnicities in the camp, 
the Poles most consistently fail all tests of national-imperial together-
ness. The moment of their closest contact with the Russian people takes 
place during the Christmas theatricals, which harmonize all tensions and 
bring together representatives of all ethnic, political, and confessional 
factions. The theatricals scene in The House of the Dead and Vremia's last 
issue reinforce each other's message: only Russian culture and ideas can 
gain the hearts and minds of the minorities. Violence and oppression 
never will. 
Indeed, Dostoevskii's descriptions of the Poles in The House of the Dead 
are less venomous than in his later fiction. The narrator often rational-
izes the Poles' behavior, reminding his readers that their noble status and 
greater remove from their homeland call for understanding: 
All of [the Poles] were morally ill [bol'nye nravstvennd], bilious, irritable, 
and mistrustful. This is unders tandable : their lot was very hard, m u c h 
harder than ours. They were far from their homeland . Some of them 
had long t e rms—ten , twenty years. And most importantly, they looked 
at the people who su r rounded them with deep prejudice, seeing in the 
prisoners only brutality. They could n o t — d i d no t even want to —see in 
them a single good trait, anything h u m a n . This too was unders tandable : 
this point of view was unfortunately forced on them by circumstances, by 
their fate. It was clear that melancholy [toska] was suffocating them. 8 8 
85. Nechaeva, Zhurnal "Epokha," 214. Nechaeva also notes numerous examples of 
Epokha endorsing these two journals' positions. Dolinin may be overstating his case, how-
ever, when he sees Epokha as proof that the Dostoevskii brothers joined Katkov's camp. 
Dolinin, "K tzenzurnoi," 2:561-62. 
86. Edyta M. Bojanowska, "Chekhov's The Duel, or How to Colonize Responsibly," in 
Carol Apollonio and Angela Brintlinger, eds., Chekhov for the 21st Century (Bloomington, 
Ind., 2012). 
87. Beth Holmgren, "Cataclysm, Nation, Self: An Endoscopy of Polish Lives" (paper, 
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, November 2009). 
88. Dostoevskii, Zapiski iz Mertvogo doma, PSS, 4:209-10. 
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Dostoevskii also notes the Poles' instances of integrity and bravery. For 
example, he reports how one Polish convict carried in his arms a sick 
comrade during their long journey on foot between prisons.89 
Interestingly, the serialization of The House of the Dead offered Dos-
toevskii hints that the government was highly sensitive on the subject of 
Poland—hints that he nonetheless disregarded in 1863. The censors held 
back the chapter devoted to the Polish political prisoners (Part II, Chap-
ter 8, "Companions"), which was published out of sequence half a year af-
ter the work's serialization ended.90 Only one out of three editions of The 
House of the Dead during Dostoevskii's lifetime included it. It seems incred-
ible that the description of the hell-like bathhouse or of the consump-
tive Russian prisoner dying in fetters—the episodes that truly shocked 
the Russian audience—seemed to the authorities less incendiary than 
the much less graphic descriptions of the mistreatment of Polish political 
prisoners. This shows that the state placed a high premium on its imperial 
commitment in Poland and on maintaining the Russian citizens' belief in 
the government's benevolent conduct toward its imperial subjects. Dos-
toevskii ignored this lesson and lost his first journal. 
Nation, Empire, and Vremids Final Issue 
The scandal of Vremia's, closing reminds us of the possible gaps with which 
the historical evidence records social mood. Herzen's London circle was 
not unique in opposing the government's repression of the Polish Upris-
ing. It was merely unique in its freedom to voice this opposition. Public 
opinion about the Polish Uprising within the Russian empire may have 
been more varied than what can be seen from the press that was allowed 
to function. Nor was domestic discontent limited to the (silent) liberal 
faction. To oppose an expensive and repressive empire, the Dostoevskii 
brothers marshalled their critique from a moderate and nationalist posi-
tion in line with the journal's philosophy of pochvennichestvo. Strakhov 
articulates reasons why Russia's disengagement from the Polish kingdom 
would make perfect sense. The entire issue harmonizes with this message 
and hazards sharp critiques of the government as well as proposals for 
restructuring the empire into a benevolent one based on the consent of 
the governed. 
My analysis of Vremia's ill-fated final issue shows that the attitudes of 
the Russian intelligentsia toward the empire were very complicated. We 
need to attend to this complexity—in particular to the space between 
"for" and "against"—and to render it with more nuance. The interweav-
ing of imperial questions with national ones also poses a challenge. Olga 
89. The Poles whom Dostoevskii met in prison also left their impressions of him. 
See, for example, Szymon Tokarzewski, Siedem lat Katorgi (Warsaw, 1907). For an analysis 
of the Poles' accounts and for excerpts in English, see Elizabeth Blake, "Portraits of the 
Siberian Dostoevsky by Poles in 'The House of the Dead,'" Dostoevsky Studies, n.s. 10 (2006): 
56-71. 
90. It appeared in Vremia, no. 12 (1862): 235-49. 
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Maiorova's recent study traces a productive and highly diverse interplay 
of national and imperial discourses in Russian culture in the postreform 
era, a topic that has also generated much historical research.91 "A Fateful 
Question" and its journalistic convoy participate in this lively debate and 
yoke imperial concerns to national ones. Vremia argues that in its ruth-
less militaristic expansionism, the state belied core national ideals. An 
imperial policy more in tune with the spiritual values of the Russian na-
tion (peace, tolerance, cultural diversity) would be more likely to secure 
a strong and lasting empire.92 Vremia chafes about the bloodstained and 
expensive empire, but it does not consider a cheaper one a bad idea at all. 
The journal's authors clearly distinguish between the government's con-
duct of imperial policy and the very idea of empire. While the former in-
spires Vremia!?, critique, the latter faces no objections. After all, Dostoevskii 
considered empire the best thing that Russia gained in its thousand years 
of history. The nationalists grouped around Vremia simply wanted a differ-
ent empire: less cosdy and more sustainable. They also wanted ambitious 
imperial agendas to follow Russia's attainment of strong nationhood. Yet 
however one conceived it, the empire was the ultimate goal of Russian 
history for Vremia, for Dostoevskii, and for a vast majority of nineteendi-
century Russians.93 
91. Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire. Key historical studies of this topic include 
Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Rus-
sian Far East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge, Eng., 1999), and Bassin, "Geographies of Impe-
rial Identity," in Dominic Lieven, ed., The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 
Eng., 2006), 45-63; Hosking, Russia; Miller, Romanov Empire, chap. 6; Renner, Russischer 
Nationalismus; Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation (London, 2001). Theodore Weeks, 
"Slavdom, Civilization, Russification: Comments on Russia's World-Historical Mission, 
1861-1878," Ablmperio, no. 2 (2002): 223-48, and Weeks, Nation and State. 
92. This is consistent with the position of A. F. Gil'ferding, another prominent voice 
on the Polish Question. For Gil'ferding the real harm of the January Uprising lay in its 
forcing the Russians to act in violation of their fundamental national values, such as toler-
ance, generosity, and respect for other cultures. See Weeks, "Slavdom," 231-32. 
93. Mark Beissinger made this argument eloquently in his 2007 Presidential Address 
to the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic 
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